comparable classes, but there are no others like them. They are large, permanent, unchangeable, natural classes. No other kind of class is susceptible to implications of innate inferiority. ..."
Attitudes, and traditions based on these attitudes, therefore, have served effectively to limit the participation of women in all aspects of human endeavor. The burden of disadvantage imposed on this single class is staggering. It persists, despite rapid and incontrovertible changes in the society which should have rendered such disadvantage a relic-and despite the fact that, as John Stuart Mill said one I ' hundred years ago : ". . . the considerations which r ecommended (the system) may, like so many other primeval social facts of the greatest importance, have subsequently . .. ceased to exist." The greatly increased participation of women in our nation's present-day economic life can only confl ict with law and custom designed too long ago to have relevance for modern life. This is the precise reason that, for some, the provision of a ban on discrimination in employment because of sex is tantamount to a revolution in this field .
According to a report issued by the President's Commission on the Status of Women in 1963: "Women's participation in paid employment importantly increases the Nation's labor force: one worker in three is a woman." This report revealed that in any average month during 1962, there were 23 million women at work, with a forecast for 30 million by 1970. Some 17 million women in an average month were working full time. Approximately three out of five working women are married, and among married women, one in three is working (among non-whites, almost one in two).
According to the 1960 Census, women filled a wide range of occupations-18,632 of them were bus drivers! The largest concentration, of course, is in the clerical field: seven million. Three other main groupings (service workers, factory operatives, and professional and technical employees) number between three and four million each.
Salary Differentials
Earnings of women continue to average only about 60 per cent of those for men. The fact that there are wage differentials between men and women, for the same kind of work, has been substantiated time and again; one study of 1,900 companies revealed that one-third of them had dual pay scales in effect for similar office jobs. Reluctance to consider women on their merits-with equal opportunity as it relates to earnings, training, advancement, and the like-results in under-utilization of talent for which our economy cries out and which needlessly inhibits the growth and development of a wide sector of the workforce.
The Commission on the Status of Women stated in the strongest possible terms that "Equ al opportunity for women in hiring, training, and promotion should be the governing principle in private employment. " They recommended that this be incorporated in an Executive Order to be applied to work done under Federal contracts.
More recently, the California Department of Industrial Relations has issued a report in which it is revealed that in California, at least, little has changed for the woman worker. In 1965, 34 of every 100 workers were women. And the "sizeable dollar gap" persists. This report concludes:
"Information on earnings makes apparent that Women have yet to marshal their resources to overcome economic disparities that have accompanied their mass movement into the workforce in this century." E mploymen t Discrimination The response of women to Title VII has been an overwhelming phenomenon. During the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's first year, we received nearly 9,000 charges of employment discrimination (some four and onehalf times the number predicted) . Of this number, 37 per cent cited sex as the basis of the charge. Very early, it became apparent that a significant amount of work would be devoted to this segment Am eri can Association of Industrial Nurses Journal, May. 1967 of the American workforce-along with the predicted workload from Negro and Latin-American citizens. With little experience from other Federal agencies or from state agencies to guide us, the Commission has proceeded with caution in interpreting the scope and application of Title VII 's prohibition on discrimination because of sex, lest an overly literal interpretation disrupt long-standing employment practices required by state laws on collective bargaining agreements. The Commission's Guidelines on this subect were issued in "an effort to temper the bare language of the statute with common sense and a sympathetic understanding of the position and needs of women workers. Nevertheless, where the plain command of the statute is that there be no artificial classification of jobs by sex, the Commission feels bound to follow it, notwithstanding the fact that such segregation has, in particular cases, worked to the benefit of the woman worker.
"P r obably the most difficult area considered in (the) guidelines is the relation of Title VII to state legislation designed originally to protect women workers. The Commission cannot assume that Congress intended to strike down such legislation. Yet our study demonstrates that some of this legislation is irrelevant to present day needs of women, and much of this legislation is capable, in particular applications, of denying effective equality of opportunity to women." I am reminded here, again, of John Stuart Mill who wrote, in the same work referred to earlier:
"The generality of a practice is in some cases a strong presumption that it is, or at all events once was, conducive to laudable ends. This is the case, when the practice was first adopted, or afterwards kept up, as a means to such ends . ..."
Thus "Title VII, which makes suspect any sex distinction in employment, and state protective legislation, which requires special treatment for women, represent competing value judgments which cannot easily be harmonized. Clarification and improvements can, however, be achieved. We believe it desirable-even essential-that Congress and the state legislatures address themselves to this problem. State legislatures will find archaic provisions in their laws which should be updated. And the Congress may wish to determine how much weight should be given to outmoded laws whose practical effect today is not so much to protect as to disadvantage."
Approaching these problems on a case-by-case basis, the Commission has encountered a wide variety of issues which constitute the New Industrial Revolution. Individual charges have covered the entire range of unfair practices based on sexdiscriminatory hiring and promotion policies; abridgements of seniority or recall rights; differential wages and fringe benefits; the denial of opportunity for training; limited advancement. In addition to the charges it has received, the Commission has also issued rulings and opinions. Among its rulings are the following: (1) The bona fide occupational qualification exception as to sex should be interpreted narrowly, since labels ("men's jobs," "women's jobs") tend to deny employment opportunities unnecessarily to one sex or the other. (2) It is an unlawful employment practice to classify a job as "male" or "female" or to maintain separate lines of progression or separate seniority lists based on sex where this would adversely affect any employee, unless sex is a bona fide occupational qualification for that job. (3) An employer's rule which forbids or restricts the employment of married women and which is not applicable to married men is discrimination based on sex, prohibited by Title VII. . . . It does not seem to us relevant that the rule is not directed against all females, but only against -rnar r ied females, for so long as sex is a factor in the application of the rule, such application involves a discrimination based on se x.
Legal Opinion
In response to a request for a legal opinion, the Commission's General Counsel has stated: "In general, an employer would be ill-advised to determ ine arbitrarily that women are inherently better able to perform one category of jobs or men another without taking into consideration the particular capabilities of individual job applicants. If the classification of jobs by sex is violative of Title VII, the fact that it is determined through collective bargaining rather than unilaterally is of no particular significance." Another opinion states: "The removal of discriminatory classifications may in certain instances result in the occupation by a male of a job previously held by a female. The effect of Title VII is to open for both sexes jobs and opportunities 14 previously limited to one sex, unless sex is a bona fide occupational qualification for the performance of a particular job." And it is true that, in some instances, male w or k ers have benefited by Title VII's ban on discrimination because of sex.
Decisions reached in cases of sex discrimination have resulted in many changes for women workers in the United States. Where labor-management contracts have been found to violate Title VII, these have been rewritten. For some there is new meaning in the word "seniority," as female employees may exercise their rights to jobs denied them previously, when segregated lines of promotion and seniority were in operation. Advances in technology continue to make it possible for women to perform a number of jobs formerly conceded to be " too heavy" for them, and there is constant necessity to re-appraise and often reclassify work once limited to men.
Summary
Millions of working women are the wage earners, for themselves and for other s; millions of othersespecially those with small children-must supplement the family income. But ac cording to Mrs. Anna Rosenberg Hoffman:
" Besides the financial n eed, women also have a need to make a contribution-to spend their time usefully and to realize the satisfaction of accomplishment and the utilization of their abilities. . . . "Women who want to work and need to work should have the opportunity. A country striving for excellence cannot overlook a major portion of its population. No country can reach the ultimate height of brainpower and creativity without its women. That would be like permitting half the machinery in a factory to remain idle." Or, as John Stuart Mill wrote, one hundred years ago:
"Is there so great a superfluity of men fit for high duties, that society can afford to reject the services of an y competent person? .. . would it be consistent with justice to refu se to (women) their fair share of honour and distinction, or to deny to them the equal moral right of all human beings to choose their occupation (short of injury to others) according to their own preferences, at their own risk? Nor is the injustice confined to them: it is shared by those who are in a position to benefit by their services."
